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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to illustrate that a systems approach to transit safety 
can be used to develop a methodology to fail-safe or mistake-proof paratransit 
operations. The fail-safe methodology illustrated in this article was implemented in 
a small rural transit system in the southeast U.S. Results demonstrated that safety 
problems often stem from an interaction of service errors and system components. 
Results also revealed that fail-safe methods that target speciﬁc user groups are more 
eﬀective than more general methods. 
Introduction
Mistakes occur in all paratransit systems. Some of these mistakes may lead to sig-
niﬁcant service failures that could endanger passengers, drive up insurance costs, 
diminish productivity, and damage the transit system’s reputation. Advanced 
computer software and state-of-the-art equipment do not insulate paratransit 
systems from errors that could compromise service safety (Einstein 2001). More-
over, many transit systems, especially rural and small urban systems, cannot aﬀord 
expensive technology or external consultants to help them mistake-proof opera-
tions.
Given increasing liability costs, paratransit managers need inexpensive yet eﬀec-
tive error prevention techniques that are easy to understand and simple to imple-
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ment. To meet this need, this study developed a fail-safe methodology to help 
managers identify and correct mistakes before they generate signiﬁcant safety 
problems. This fail-safe methodology represents a hands-on approach to reducing 
errors in service delivery. Like other quality management tools, fail-safe techniques 
have played a role in industrial quality programs for many years (Stewart 2003). In 
contrast to statistical process control methods, which require statistical analysis 
of large amounts of historical data, fail-safe techniques emphasize performance 
standards, worker empowerment, and information ﬂows to prevent defects. This 
study will illustrate how an actual paratransit system used a fail-safe methodology 
to analyze the error generation and prevention process in its operations.
The next section provides an overview of the systems approach to the mistake-
prooﬁng process for service safety. A discussion of the research context and the 
methodology follows this overview. An application of the methodology in an 
actual paratransit system is then presented. The article concludes with the mana-
gerial implications of the study.
A Systems Approach to Paratransit Safety
The delivery of safe transit service requires a coordinated eﬀort between transit 
workers and transit customers, as well as the eﬀective use of technology and 
management and control systems (Prioni and Hensher 2000). Since a safe opera-
tion is the product of the entire transit system rather than a single component 
of the system, preventing mistakes that could endanger passengers or lead to 
injury, accidents, or property damage requires a systemwide approach (Sulek and 
Lind 2000). In describing their framework for service delivery, Chase and Bowen 
(1991) emphasized the need for a systems approach when analyzing and improv-
ing service operations and identiﬁed technology, systems and people as the three 
major components of service operations. This article will adopt Chase and Bowen’s 
systems framework to study how potentially harmful mistakes may be generated 
in a paratransit system and how these mistakes could be prevented before they 
endanger system employees, the public, or property.
Like Chase and Bowen’s (1991) framework, the systems approach that will guide 
this fail-safe study models technology, systems and people as the three major 
components of service delivery. In a paratransit system, the technology compo-
nent includes vehicles, lift equipment, machinery, and tools, as well as facilities like 
garages and administrative oﬃces. The systems component involves procedures 
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and software for scheduling, routing, maintenance, transport, inventory, planning, 
and performance evaluation. The ﬁnal component, people, encompasses both the 
service providers, such as drivers and oﬃce personnel, and community stakehold-
ers, such as riders, local agencies, medical providers, and industries. 
An eﬀective fail-safe methodology should address all three system components 
and help the manager anticipate how these components might interact to pro-
duce errors that could endanger others or damage property. For example, if a driver 
lacks technical skills or knowledge, he may make a serious mistake in operating the 
van lift equipment and injure himself or the passenger (people-technology inter-
action). If the scheduling system does not capture critical information regarding 
a passenger (e.g., the rider is hearing impaired), the driver will not be forewarned 
of a potential safety problem (people-system interaction). If the maintenance 
scheduling software is not reliable, it may fail to schedule routine maintenance for 
a van. Poor maintenance could result in mechanical failure that may endanger the 
driver and riders (technology-system interaction). If the scheduling software does 
not remind a driver that it is time for a routine physical, a health problem may go 
unnoticed until driver impairment causes a traﬃc accident (people-system-tech-
nology interaction) (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Systems Model of Paratransit Service Delivery
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Not all service errors arise from an interaction of two or more system components. 
Some mistakes result from the people component alone (Friman et al. 1998). For 
instance, a dispatcher could jeopardize an elderly dialysis patient’s health by not 
promptly notifying a van driver that the patient was ready for pick-up from the 
doctor’s oﬃce. A driver may spend too long taking a break and later try to com-
pensate for lost time by rushing passengers. A front-oﬃce worker may forget to 
notify a passenger about a change in rider eligibility status. These types of worker-
generated mistakes clearly require fail-safe measures. 
Fail-safe measures also apply to the behaviors and attitudes of paratransit custom-
ers. In many services, a signiﬁcant proportion of problems stem from mistakes 
made by the customers themselves. Chase and Stewart (1994) identiﬁed three 
major sources of customer mistakes: (1) failure to understand and anticipate the 
customer’s role during service delivery; (2) failure to follow instructions, remem-
ber crucial steps, or communicate service needs during the service process; and (3) 
failure to alert management about service problems once the service is complete. 
Since riders and other paratransit customers can make any of these mistakes, fail-
safe methods that target customer participation skills and information access can 
help promote paratransit safety. 
In particular, elderly riders may beneﬁt from such fail-saﬁng eﬀorts. The number 
of elderly citizens in the United States is expected to increase signiﬁcantly as 
baby boomers age. Mobilty needs of the elderly are expected to increase as larger 
numbers of older adults try to lead active lives, despite age-related problems that 
impair driving skills (Rosenbloom 2001). Elderly drivers tend to experience high 
accident rates (Burkhardt 1999); moreover, even conservative projections indicate 
that, by 2030, the number of fatalities in automobile accidents involving elderly 
drivers will quadruple the 1996 level (Hildebrand 2003; Burkhardt and McGavock 
1999). Paratransit services that are safe and easy for elderly riders to use can reduce 
the need for older adults with serious health problems to drive. In addition, fail-
safe methods can help elderly riders use paratransit systems safely.
In addition to addressing the people, technology and systems components of ser-
vice delivery, a fail-safe methodology must also analyze the relationships among 
the various stages in paratransit service. There are two arguments for modeling 
paratransit service as a multistage process. First, the consequences of the interac-
tions among technology, people, and systems may vary with the service stage. For 
instance, if a dialysis patient unbuckled one of his safety belts during transport, 
serious injury could result if the driver had to slam on the brakes suddenly. If 
Fail-Safe Methods for Paratransit Safety
69
the van has already stopped at the dialysis center when the rider unbuckles the 
belt, risk to the patient is not nearly so great. Second, the stages of paratransit 
service are not independent of one another. What happens at one stage may 
aﬀect service delivery a later stage. If unchecked, small mistakes made during an 
early, or upstream, stage of the service process may “snowball” into problems at a 
downstream stage (Perrow 1984) (Figure 2). These problems may involve minor 
incidents or catastrophic failure. For instance, if the ﬁrst passenger on a route is 
late for pick-up, the driver may not be able to pick up other passengers on time. 
These other passengers could arrive late for their medical appointments or miss 
them entirely, thus endangering their well-being.
Figure 2. System Failure/Snowball Effect
Although interdependency among service stages is quite common in many ser-
vice operations, little research has been done to illustrate the eﬀectiveness of a 
multistage approach to process improvement (Sulek 2004). However, a few recent 
articles in the service management literature have argued that a stage-by-stage 
analysis of a service operation can reveal problems that could be overlooked by 
organization-level analysis alone. For instance, Souteriou and Hadjinicola (1999) 
used a multistage approach to optimize customer perception with service deliv-
ery. Armstrong (1995) modeled the eﬀect of service interventions in multiple 
service stages as a function of customer perceptions and service attributes at each 
stage. Sulek, Marucheck and Lind (2005) analyzed labor productivity in a multi-
stage service process consisting of serially dependent stages.  
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A fail-safe methodology based on multistage analysis can do more than help 
managers avoid routine errors; it can also help to prevent major service failures 
that appear to occur simply by chance. Perrow (1984) discussed such failures and 
concluded that many result from an unanticipated interaction of multiple errors 
that arise from multiple sources. These errors, taken individually, may not seem 
signiﬁcant, yet their interaction can produce catastrophic consequences. 
Since even small mistakes can cause major problems, paratransit managers cannot 
aﬀord to be reactive or adopt a hit-or-miss approach in error prevention. Instead, 
managers need a more rigorous approach that will help them break the chain of 
service errors that can lead to safety problems or catastrophic service failures. The 
following section describes such a fail-safe methodology and discusses how it was 
used to mistake-proof operations at a small urban transit system.
Research Context and Method
A rural paratransit system located in western North Carolina served as the 
research context for this study. The system served an area covering 500 square 
miles and operated 27 lift vans. The system’s exposure to safety problems had risen 
signiﬁcantly over the past decade, with vehicle miles increasing from 325,000 miles 
per year to 750,000 miles per year and the number of passenger trips growing from 
50,000 trips per year to 90,000 trips per year. Providing safe, dependable transport 
was a priority for the manager of this system. The manager realized that mistakes 
had led to accidents and service incidents in the past and decided to apply fail-safe 
procedures to aspects of operations that could compromise safety.
To begin the fail-safe eﬀort, the manager and the authors used system records, 
the manager’s expert knowledge, and process mapping to model service ﬂows and 
identify key service stages or links. Problem areas that needed fail-safe attention 
were determined for the stages in the process map. An iterative process, as shown 
in Figure 3, was used to trace problem causes and devise and assess fail-safe solu-
tions.  
From this collaborative analysis, a fail-safe methodology was developed. The fol-
lowing activities constitute a continuous fail-safe process:
• Develop and revise a process map of service delivery. By indicating the 
individual service delivery stages, the process map will make it easier to 
determine where service problems occur (Chase and Stewart 1994).
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• Create a list of service problems that occur at each service stage in the 
process map. Maintaining a list of problems and complaints as they arise 
will help with this step. Using this list, feedback from transit employees 
and customers, system performance metrics, and maintenance and repair 
records, the manager can anticipate future safety incidents and problems.
• Identify the causes or errors that could lead to the problems listed in the 
preceding step. Finding the causes often involves working backward through 
the process to identify the original mistakes that “snowballed” or escalated 
into downstream service failures.
• Devise fail-safe solutions to prevent the types of mistakes that were identi-
ﬁed in the preceding step.
• Develop service performance metrics based on operating data to assess the 
eﬀectiveness of the fail-safe methods.
• Gather feedback from service customers to assess quality of service deliv-
ery.
• Use the performance metrics and customer feedback to update the fail-safe 
methods and improve service performance.
Figure 3. Fail-Safe Process
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An initial activity in the fail-safe process involves charting all of the critical stages 
that service delivery entails. The process map should accomplish three important 
objectives: (1) trace the rider’s participation in service delivery; (2) highlight critical 
back-oﬃce tasks; and (3) identify all major points of interaction between transit 
employees and riders. It is important to meet all three objectives because riders’ 
mistakes, employees’ errors, and problematic interactions between transit work-
ers and customers all contribute to safety problems. 
Figure 4 presents a process map for paratransit services provided by the small 
system that served as the research context in this study. The process map depicts 
eight critical stages in this paratransit operation: (1) the rider’s initial request for 
service, which is shown as the Rider-Dispatcher link on the diagram; (2) conﬁrma-
tion that the rider is eligible for services, which involves the Department of Social 
Services (DSS)/Agency-Dispatcher link; (3) ride scheduling, which involves the Dis-
patcher-Scheduler link; (4) manifest creation, which involves the Scheduler-Driver 
link; (5) rider pick-up, which involves the Driver-Rider Pick-Up link; (6) transport 
of riders to their appointments, which is shown as the Rider-Transport link; (7) 
rider pick-up after their appointments, which involves the Doctor’s Oﬃce-Driver 
link; and (8) transport of the riders back home, which is shown as the Return Trip 
link. 
The next phase of the fail-safe process involves an examination of each critical 
link in transit service delivery. A close look at each link can help the manager 
Figure 4. Transit Process Flow
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determine the types of service problems that could occur at each stage and make 
it easier to identify the mistakes that caused them. The analysis should include all 
service problems—not just apparent safety problems—because an interaction of 
even minor service errors can sometimes generate serious incidents. Tables 1 and 
2 illustrate the problem/cause analysis phase for two service links: the Driver-Rider 
Pick-Up link and the Transport link. (Similar tables were developed for the other 
service links but are not shown.) 
Table 1. Driver-Rider Pick-Up Link:  
Service Problems and Mistakes
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In the Driver-Rider Pick-Up link, both riders and drivers face such service problems 
as late pick-ups, boarding mishaps, and physical barriers to boarding. As Table 1 
illustrates, these problems stem from a variety of causes.
Riders can cause pick-up delays if they are not ready to leave when the van arrives, 
if hearing impairment prevents them from hearing the driver blowing the horn, 
or if they simply forget to cancel their ride appointments. Agencies like nursing 
homes also cause delays and no-shows if they do not have patients ready for trans-
port when the van arrives. All of these mistakes involve the people component 
of the service system. On the other hand, there are a number of other causes for 
late pick-ups that are beyond an individual’s control. These include heavy traﬃc, 
accidents, road construction, and adverse weather conditions. Schedule creep also 
contributes to late pick-ups.
Boarding mishaps can occur if riders who use wheelchairs rely on inadequate 
homemade ramps to help them exit their homes. Such ramps can easily collapse, 
injuring both the passenger and the driver. Without an adequate ramp, a driver 
may require a great deal of extra assistance with the passenger. In some cases, it 
may be impossible to get the rider on board safely, and the driver may have to 
refuse service to the passenger. A driver will also refuse service when parents try 
to bring children on board without approved safety seats. Both of these problems 
involve both the technology and people components of service delivery, since 
rider ignorance and faulty equipment can diminish safety.
Sometimes a driver in this paratransit operation cannot get the van close enough 
to the rider’s home for a pick-up. A number of physical barriers can block safe 
access to a rider’s home. For instance, fallen trees or tree limbs may obstruct the 
driveway; the driveway itself may be too steep, too winding, or too long to travel 
over safely; or the road surface may contain deep ruts or be too muddy. Drivers 
may ﬁnd that even if a driveway is fairly safe, there is no way to easily push a wheel-
chair across the passenger’s yard to the van. A driver may need a great deal of extra 
help in conveying a wheelchair rider to the van if no sidewalks are available.  
Table 2, which shows the Rider-Transport link, describes the kinds of problems 
a passenger might experience during an actual ride. The worst problems include 
traﬃc accidents, which stem from poor driving technique by the van operator; 
driver inattention, driver impairment and on-board distraction; passenger injuries, 
which result from traﬃc accidents; failure to secure passengers in their seats; and 
passengers’ misunderstanding of the rider’s role during transit. At this paratransit 
system, some wheelchair riders have been injured after unfastening seat belts and 
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straps while the van was nearing the dialysis center. These passengers thought they 
were being helpful by speeding up the unloading process and did not realize that 
their behavior was inappropriate and unsafe until it was too late. To a large extent, 
these problems involve the people component of service delivery.
Table 2. Transport Link:  
Service Problems and Causes
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Vehicle breakdowns and equipment malfunction can also give the impression that 
a ride is not a safe one or can lead to accidents. These problems may stem from 
poor preventive maintenance, unsuitable operating environments (such as badly 
rutted dirt roads), or inadequate equipment (such as an air conditioning system 
that is too small to cool the van if the doors are opened frequently). These types 
of problems pertain mostly to the systems and technology components of service 
delivery. 
Even if a passenger considers a ride safe, he or she may ﬁnd it unpleasant. This can 
occur if the driver is rude or unhelpful to passengers, if the ride is not smooth, or 
if fellow passengers are disruptive or threatening. The passenger may also believe 
that the service is too slow. While poor road conditions can make a trip seem 
longer, a driver’s failure to stay on schedule can also delay a trip. The people com-
ponent of service delivery contributes to many of these service problems. 
Development of Fail-Safe Methods
Once a manager identiﬁes mistakes that cause service problems, fail-safe methods 
can be developed to reduce the chance of service errors. These fail-safe methods 
may involve improving access to information, instituting some new operating 
procedures, and modifying worker or rider behavior.
As Table 3 shows, the chief causes of late pick-ups and boarding problems on 
the Driver/Rider Pick-Up link stem from schedule creep, adverse road or weather 
conditions, rider mistakes, and physical barriers to boarding. Better training of 
drivers in the importance of on-time pick-ups may help reduce schedule creep. 
Reduction of the number of no-shows can also help diminish schedule creep. To 
help minimize no-shows, the dispatcher at this system could phone elderly rid-
ers the day before their appointments to remind them of the pick-up time. The 
dispatcher could also phone nursing homes with high no-show rates 10 minutes 
before scheduled pick-ups and ask personnel to have the patient ready for pick-
up. In the event of adverse travel conditions, the dispatcher at this system could 
call the doctor’s oﬃce to try to reschedule the rider for a later appointment or 
might call the rider to cancel the pick-up if the roads are unsafe. The dispatcher 
also can help prevent some of the riders’ mistakes by asking them to be ready one 
hour early for pick-ups on long routes or by reminding a parent to bring along an 
approved child’s seat if his or her child will be riding in the van. 
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Table 3. Driver/Rider Pick-Up Link:  
Problem Causes and Fail-Safe Solutions
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The Department of Social Services and individual agencies can also help to educate 
parents about the importance of approved safety seats when their children ride in 
the van and can explain how to obtain these seats free of charge from the local ﬁre 
department. The ﬁre department currently trains parents in the correct use of the 
safety seats. The DSS can further decrease rider error by educating riders about the 
need to cancel pick-ups if their plans change.
The preceding discussion illustrates that the people component of the system can 
help address many of the errors at this service link. In particular, better educa-
tion of the riders and agencies in their roles as paratransit customers represents a 
promising fail-safe approach. 
Fail-safe methods that deal with the systems component of service delivery can 
also be used at this link. For instance, the transit manager regularly addresses the 
problem of physical barriers to boarding. If low tree branches obstruct access to a 
rider’s driveway, either the transit manager or the operations manager will inspect 
the problem. Usually, they ask the city utility service to clear away the overhanging 
tree limbs. In this transit system, volunteers from the local churches and the Senior 
Center help to ﬁx ruts in riders’ driveways or clear fallen trees from driveways. 
Volunteers also build safe ramps for riders who need but cannot aﬀord them. As 
mentioned earlier, safe ramps are essential to boarding safety; a driver may refuse 
to board a rider if the ramp appears unsound. If a rider’s yard is inaccessible, the 
driver can call the local Emergency Medical Service (EMS), the operations man-
ager, or the transit manager for immediate help with the passenger.  
Service problems and potential fail-safe solutions for the Transport link are sum-
marized in Table 4. This table reveals that some of the technical mistakes that driv-
ers make, such as following too closely or driving too fast, stem from insuﬃcient 
time to complete the route safely. Poor planning by the driver can cause this time 
shortage, but so can schedule creep from no-shows and delays that riders cause 
during pick-ups. If a driver attempts to compensate for these delays with aggres-
sive driving, accidents can occur. Thus, fail-safe measures that address no-shows 
and rider-generated delays at earlier service links may help reduce the likelihood 
of accidents during transport. 
Driver training, vehicle inspection, and managerial observation of driver perfor-
mance also constitute fail-safe methods for the Transport link. Training classes 
can target various issues, such as driving techniques, dealing with disruptive pas-
sengers, ﬁrst aid/CPR, and drug and alcohol awareness. Reinforcement of material 
covered in training classes also serves as a fail-safe method. For instance, a sign with 
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a single question about correct safety procedure (e.g. “How should you hold a baby 
to administer CPR?”) can be placed where drivers will see it before they begin their 
route. The manifest pick-up point is a good location for such “memory ticklers.”
The preceding discussion shows that many of the fail-safe methods appropriate to 
this link involve the people component to a large extent; however, the technology 
Table 4. Transport Link:  
Problem Causes and Fail-Safe Solutions
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component also plays a critical role. Since mechanical failure can cause serious 
safety problems with the vehicle or lift equipment, preventive maintenance fail-
safe methods are especially important. For instance, at this system, each van driver 
must inspect his vehicle prior to beginning his route. Among other things, the 
driver must measure air pressure in the tires and check the oil level for the engine, 
the coolant level, the power steering ﬂuid level, and brake ﬂuid level. After com-
pleting the inspection, the driver must complete the pretrip inspection form and 
note any problems with the vehicle. He must then either correct the problem or 
request another van. Prior to using the replacement van, the driver must conduct 
an inspection and complete a pretrip form for the new van. If the manager discov-
ers that a driver either overlooked a problem or did not report it on the pretrip 
form, the manager will do the pretrip inspection with the driver until the manager 
determines he need no longer do so. The 6,000 mile oil change and inspection for 
each vehicle also captures how well each driver maintains his or her vehicle.
Testing the Effectiveness of Fail-Safe Methods
After a manager implements fail-safe methods, he needs to gauge their eﬀective-
ness. There is no way for a manager to know if the new methods actually improved 
service quality unless he selects and monitors performance metrics for those 
aspects of service he was trying to fail-safe. For instance, at this transit system, the 
manager created a demand response form to capture data on assigned pick-up 
times and actual pick-up times for each rider. The data enabled the manager to 
estimate variances in pick-up times and determine if the system was doing a better 
job in reducing wait times for passengers. Analysis revealed that a slight variance 
reduction (<5%) occurred after driver training classes placed increased emphasis 
on meeting pick-up times.
Similarly, the manager collected data on the number of riders that were “no-shows” 
when the van arrived for pick-ups. This type of data was useful for determining if 
fail-safe measures helped riders do a better job of being ready for pick-up. Analysis 
showed that reminder phone calls to elderly riders who were frequent no-shows 
reduced the no-show rate for this particular group by 50 percent. Analysis also 
showed that the call-ahead policy to nursing homes whose patients were habitu-
ally late resulted in an almost 100 percent improvement in the problem.
Another set of metrics for this system reveals the eﬀectiveness of the fail-safe 
methods for preventive maintenance. As mentioned earlier, a variety of methods 
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such as pretrip inspections, pretrip inspection forms, spot checks by the system 
manger and the operations manager, the 6,000-mile oil change and inspection, 
and an annual inspection are used to make preventive maintenance fail-safe. 
Results reveal that the number of wrecker calls for disabled vans declined by 90 
percent. The severity of the problems also declined; before preventive mainte-
nance was made fail-safe, many wrecker calls involved serious mechanical failures 
like broken axles or brake failures. After fail-safe procedures were initiated, most 
wrecker calls involved a ﬂat tire or a vehicle stuck on a muddy or ﬂooded road. 
Other performance metrics conﬁrmed the eﬀectiveness of the fail-safe methods 
for preventive maintenance: tire wear improved from 18,000 miles before the fail-
safe program began to 30,000 miles afterward, while brake lining wear increased 
from 14,000 miles to 40,000 miles.
The manager also used the wrecker calls, tire wear, and brake wear metrics to 
gauge the eﬀectiveness of the driver training programs. These metrics and tire 
wear patterns are also used to compare driver performance and identify which 
drivers exhibit erratic driving techniques.   
In addition to collecting operating data to assess service quality, the transit 
manager gathered information on perceived service quality from customers and 
analyzed their suggestions and complaints. The manager at this system routinely 
administered a survey on needs and resources to agencies served by the system. 
This survey consisted of both scaled questions and open-ended questions. The 
scaled questions dealt with such issues as overall satisfaction with paratransit 
service, timely provision of service, dependability of service, professional skills 
of the drivers, interpersonal skills of the drivers, and courteous and professional 
treatment by front-oﬃce employees. The open-ended questions asked what the 
system could do to improve service to the agencies and their clients, what agen-
cies considered the major shortfalls in current service, and what gaps existed in 
transporting clients. Analysis of the comments revealed that not all clients were 
aware of the range of transit services provided by this system and that some cus-
tomers simply did not understand how to use the system properly. For instance, 
one respondent did not realize that transport of patients on oxygen was already 
available, while others felt that the system was not responsive to the timing of 
their scheduling requests. The manager decided that “refresher” training sessions 
for clients at participating agencies would be helpful. At such sessions, the trainer 
could not only review the procedures for requesting service but also explain why 
certain rules were in place. 
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In addition to explaining how to use paratransit services, the trainer at these ses-
sions could also distribute wallet-sized cards listing the most important rules a 
rider must follow. Some attendees may beneﬁt from having a handy “reminder 
card” to help them remember what to do to successfully access services. If the 
print is easy to read and the color of the cards is bright, riders may be more likely 
to keep them and refer to them. 
Managerial Implications
The purpose of this study was to illustrate that fail-safe methods constitute a 
simple, low-tech, low-cost approach to reducing errors that could lead to safety 
problems in paratransit operations. While a small paratransit system served as the 
study’s research context, the methodology presented in this article is applicable to 
other transit operations and to nontransit services. 
Results from this study showed that at this transit system, fail-safe measures that 
targeted a speciﬁc rider group were far more eﬀective in reducing mistakes than 
more generic fail-safe methods. For instance, the “call ahead” policy resulted in 
almost 100 percent improvement on delays caused when nursing home patients 
were not ready for pick-up. In contrast, an increased emphasis on drivers’ atten-
tion to pick-up times produced only slight improvement (<5%) in pick-up time 
variances. 
This study also reveals that paratransit managers should not rely just on technol-
ogy solutions to prevent service errors, because safety problems can arise from 
a variety of interactions within the service system. These interactions may be 
complex and may involve transit workers, riders, health care providers, vehicles, 
equipment, software, operating procedures and control systems. Safety problems 
can also arise from the combined eﬀect of several relatively small mistakes. Tech-
nology alone cannot eliminate these mistakes or control all possible interactions 
in the system. Instead, a comprehensive fail-safe methodology that simultaneously 
addresses the people, technology and systems components of service delivery at 
each stage in the service process can help the manager anticipate and prevent 
mistakes that compromise service safety.
It is important to recognize that paratransit service is a multistage process. More-
over, the individual stages are not independent. Some problems that occur at 
later stages actually began with mistakes or service errors that originated at earlier 
stages. For instance, at the paratransit system in this study, late arrivals, missed 
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appointments and poor driving techniques—all of which can endanger a dialysis 
patient—are partly aﬀected by poor rider participation skills. Riders who are not 
ready at their pick-up times or are frequent no-shows can cause serious delays in 
the transport of other passengers. Rider/caregiver training—a fail-safe method 
based on the people component of service delivery—can reduce the likelihood 
that poor customer participation skills early in the service delivery process will 
generate service errors in later service stages.
The fail-safe methodology presented in this study represents a process approach 
for anticipating the complex interactions that produce safety problems. At this 
paratransit operation, speciﬁc fail-safe solutions were devised and continue to 
be reﬁned. While these fail-safe solutions were based on cause and eﬀect rela-
tionships that were observed or anticipated, they did not involve mathematical 
modeling techniques. Future research is needed to determine if dynamic quantita-
tive modeling techniques could outperform the seasoned, expert manager using 
system fail-safe methodology.  
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